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Bureaucracy is featured by vertical hierarchical structure in which the deci-
sion maker usually lacks direct access to the informed agent, and the span of
discretionary authority decreases top down. In this paper we investigate the
delegation scheme in three-level hierarchies. The minister delegates author-
ity to a biased senior bureaucrat, then the senior can make further delegation
decision to the junior. We provide a full characterization of the implemented
interval delegation set. It￿ s shown that the e¢ ciency is attained if and only
if the senior is intermediately biased. We reverse the conclusion in Dessein
(2002) that delegation dominates informative cheap talk and shows that, for
some range of senior￿ s preferences, the minister prefers keeping control and
using the senior as information gate-keeper. The implication for hiring pol-
icy, job contents and promotion decision in bureaucracy is examined. Given
the bias of the senior, the optimal junior should be intermediately between
the senior and the minister. Under certain conditions the loyal bureaucrat
would be assigned to action-level and doesn￿ t get promotion. Complete dele-
gation to an acquainted knowledgeable senior may arise endogenously by the
minister￿ s ignorance about the con￿ ict of interest of the junior.
Key words: Delegation, Cheap Talk, Bureaucracy, Mediator, Hierarchy
JEL classi￿cation codes: D72, D78, D82The principles of o¢ ce hierarchy and of levels of graded author-
ity mean a ￿rmly ordered system of super- and subordination in
which there is a supervision of the lower o¢ ces by the higher ones.
￿ ￿ ￿ Max Weber (1946, p. 214)
1 Introduction
In bureaucratic organization the top-level decision maker needs a chain of
mediators (hierarchy) to deliver the commands and orders to the informed
party. It￿ s usually that neither can the expert communicates directly with
the DM, nor may the DM command action-level subordinates. For example,
in budget approval procedure the minister will set a ceiling on the budget
within the senior bureaucrats￿discretion, and the latter would further assign
the decision-making right over a smaller amount to the junior o¢ cers. It￿ s
noteworthy that the span of discretionary authority is decreasing top down,
and in many cases the minister is unable to skip the senior to authorize
the juniors. In army, between divisions and battalions, regiments control
information ￿ ow from below and pass commands from above. International
organizations usually have to deliver the aid to local community via the
authorization of national government. The question this paper addresses
thus is: how to allocate decision-making right within hierarchy, and how to
￿ll the positions of hierarchy?
To answer these questions, using the classical Crawford and Sobel (1982,
henceforth, CS) cheap-talk model, we analyze organizational design in a
three-layer minister/senior/junior hierarchies. All players want to adapt to
the underlying true state, though they also gain di⁄erent private bene￿t
(bias). Only the junior agent will be informed about the true state. The
minister chooses between delegating noncontractable decision right to the
senior and keeping control rights when the junior communicates his infor-
mation via the senior (mediator cheap talk). In other words, the minister
(DM) has to control the junior (sender) via a strategic senior (mediator).
We investigate the hierarchical delegation which refers to the situation that
the minister not only assigns the control rights over a range to the senior,
but also allows the latter to further delegate the decision right to the junior.
Take the budget approval procedure as example, by delegation the minister
imposes a budget cap on the senior, and then the senior decides whether
to review the junior￿ s proposal and make decision, or set a speci￿ed budget
ceiling on the junior. By keeping control the minister hears the proposal of
the junior through the senior and then allocates budget.
1We completely characterize the interval delegation set. The e¢ cient del-
egation set obtained in minister-junior direct interaction (Holmstrom 1977,
Alonso and Matouschek 2008, henceforth AM) is still implementable in this
hierarchy if and only if the senior is intermediately biased, e.g., conserva-
tive senior bureaucrat and more conservative juniors. The intuition is that
compared with the minister, the intermediately biased senior prefers to give
more decision right to the junior, thus the minister can adjust it by imposing
a binding cap on the delegation set to the senior. However, if the senior
is opposite-biased (conservative senior vs. liberal junior) or more biased
(more conservative senior vs. conservative junior), he strictly prefers assign-
ing less discretion to the junior than the minister, which cannot be adjusted
by the minister, so e¢ cient delegation set is not implementable. Therefore a
straightforward implication for the promotion decision is that if the minister
can only choose whoever to be the senior, then the loyal bureaucrat should
be promoted and given decision right over a limited set of action.
We compare the performance of delegation and communication in hierar-
chy and reverse the in￿ uential conclusion in Dessein (2002) that delegation
dominates cheap talk whenever there exists an informative communication
equilibrium1. It￿ s shown that when the senior and the junior are of opposite
preferences, e.g., conservative-minded senior v.s. radical junior2, for some
range of preference misalignment, delegation strictly underperforms cheap
talk. The intuition is: on the one hand, compared with direct delegation,
the gain from delegation reduces as the strategic senior becomes opposite-
biased; on the other hand the opposite biased senior can improve communi-
cation e¢ ciency by ￿ltering information ￿ ow, i.e., using a speci￿c garbling of
information to relax incentive compatibility constraint (Myerson 1986), thus
cheap talk with strategic senior can raise the minister￿ s welfare relative to
direct communication (Ivanov, 2009).
We then use the characterization of delegation to study the personnel
management in bureaucracy, i.e., optimal selection of the senior and junior.
We ￿rst study the situation that the minister can reorganize the department
completely, namely the senior and the junior are chosen simultaneously. We
reverse the previous results that the loyal agent should get promotion in that
compared with appointing a more loyal agent to the senior position, this loyal
person can bene￿t the minister more in the action-level junior position, so
the minister gains in direct adaptation on the expense of indirect control.
We then look at the selection of junior bureaucrat. It￿ s shown that both the
1Dessein (2002) also investigates delegation through a mediator. However, he doesn￿ t
allow the mediator to further delegate, and only complete delegation is considered there.
2It could be that on a particular welfare program, the junior would like to increase
expenditure while the senior is inclined to reduce expenditure.
2minister and the senior prefer to select the compromised agent as the action-
level junior, i.e., the optimal perference of the junior would lie between the
minister and the senior. Furthermore, we investigate the situation when
the minister doesn￿ t have the relevant knowledge about the preferences of
the junior. The minister may optimally forgo the skip-level control of the
unacquainted juniors, and grant an acquainted knowledgeable senior with
full authority. Thus both the hierarchical structure of commands and orders
and complete delegation can arise endogenously thanks to the asymmetric
information between the minister and the senior.
The contribution of this chapter is two-fold. For the strand of mechanism
design, following Renou and Tomala (2008), we show that network structure
matters in choosing mechanism. The lack of direct access and the existence
of strategic intermediaries may change the minister￿ s choice between commu-
nication and delegation. For the research of organizational economics, our
work contributes to the understanding of the Human Resource Management
(HRM) practice in those government organizations which is characterized by
strict hierarchy and the absence of contingent contract. We show that job
design, hiring policy and promotion decision are interrelated3. Moreover, we
provide an endogenous formation of hierarchy and complete delegation due
to asymmetric information.
This work is organized as follows. In the following section we review the
related literature. In Section 3 we lay out the basic model, and investigate
the benchmark case of direct communication and delegation, which serves as
the e¢ ciency criterion. Section 4 characterizes the interval delegation set in
hierarchy, Section 5 compares delegation with mediator cheap talk (commu-
nication). Section 6 studies the hiring policy of the junior and promotion
decision, and investigate delegation scheme under uncertainty about bias.
Section 7 discusses and concludes. All proofs are relegated in Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Based on CS model, GHPS (2009) establish that by hiring a neutral media-
tor the DM could implement the optimal mechanism to extract information
from the informed expert. Ivanov (2009) and Ambrus et al (2009) show that
this result is valid with a strategic mediator for some range of preferences
(opposite bias). On the other hand, Dessein (2002) and AM (2008) ana-
lyze the delegation decision and demonstrate the dominance of delegation
over cheap talk. These works more or less discuss delegation to a strategic
uninformed mediator, but they didn￿ t take into account the possibility that
3See Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a accessible survey on this ￿eld.
3the mediator can further delegate to the informed party. Compared with
these works, we allow further transfer of decision right and focus on optimal
interval delegation scheme, instead of full delegation. We show that there
exists some range of preference misalignment in which some communication
outcome cannot be replicated by any delegation scheme. This new result has
useful implication for understanding the allocation of authority in hierarchy.
A closely related paper is the recent work by Ambrus et al (2010), who
compares the performance of closed rule and open rule in ￿ oor-committee-
lobbyist hierarchy. In terms of our work, open rule is equivalent to communi-
cation, while closed rule is complete delegation to the mediator (committee).
They stress full delegation, and they don￿ t allow the mediator (committee)
to commit to any decision rule, e.g., rubberstamp the proposal of the lob-
byist, even though the repeated interaction between the committee and the
lobbyist may provide su¢ cient incentive for the former to stick to this de-
cision rule. Thus our results on optimal interval delegation is more general.
Moreover, both hierarchical delegation and complete delegation scheme can
arise as endogenous outcome in our work.
There is a large body of literature in organizational economics which
address the bene￿ts of hierarchy. Largely motivated by bounded rationality,
the works by Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and Geankoplos
and Milgrom (1991) are concerned with the role of hierarchy in facilitating
information processing, and stress the information aggregation within vertical
structure. Based on heterogeneity among agents, another related strand of
literature since Garicano (2000) develops "knowledge-based" hierarchy. As
complementary, to a large extent we take hierarchy as a given structural
characteristic, and address the strategic behavior of agents within it, analyze
the selection of agents and choice between communication and delegation.
It￿ s noteworthy that our results that the hierarchy may arise as the result of
the minister￿ s uncertainty about the junior￿ s personal interest is in accordance
with the argument of limited information processing ability.
Tirole (1986) explicitly introduces supervisor into principal-agent rela-
tionship to study multiple-layer hierarchies. In his paper the supervisor
holds private information about the type of agent, and the focus is the collu-
sion between supervisor and agent. He establishes the equivalence between
coalition-proof contract and giving ownership to a supervisor, who subcon-
tracts with an agent further. We show that when monetary transfer is not
feasible, which is common in many bureaucratic organization, the equivalence
fails and subcontract cannot implement the optimal delegation scheme.
Our paper also contributes to the growing body of literature on strategic
communication embodied in network structure (Renou and Tomala, 2008,
Calvo-Armengol et al, 2009). In particular, in the sense that the implemen-
4tation of optimal mechanism in network structure is addressed, we are closely
related to Renou and Tomala. However, we di⁄er from this line of research
in highlighting a speci￿c mechanism: the allocation of authority. We add
a possibility that network structure may a⁄ect the decision of mechanism
designer, thus mechanism choice is a⁄ected by the network.
3 Model
An organization is composed of three players: a minister ("she", denote as
player D(ecision)M(aker)), a senior bureaucrat, and a junior bureaucrat
("he", denote as player sb and jb, respectively). The utility of each player is
of quadratic form as the classical CS model:
U (￿;y;bi) = ￿(￿ ￿ y + bi)
2 ;i = DM;sb;jb (1)
Thus their payo⁄s depend on the true state ￿ 2 ￿ = [0;1], the action
undertaken y 2 Y = R, and their private bene￿ts bi. Each player wants to
adapt to the true state though to di⁄erent extent, i.e., the ideal action is
￿ + bi. Without loss of generality, we normalize bDM = 0 and use bsb;bjb to
measure the discrepancy of interest between o¢ cers and the minister, e.g., the
bureaucrats may want to exaggerate the budget to enlarge his subordination.
For the sake of simpli￿city, we use Ui (￿;y) to refer the utility of player i.
The minister has the right to take action, and only the junior would be
informed about the true state ￿, but he could not communicate directly with
the minister, neither the minister can allocate the authority directly to the
junior. In other words, the senior has full control of the information trans-
mission between the minister and the junior. The senior and the minister
have uniform prior on ￿.
Figure 1 Timeline under communication and delegation (The solid and
dashed line represents communication and delegation, respectively)
Now we specify the timing of this game under delegation and communi-
cation in Figure 1. The minister ￿rst assigns two agents to the senior and
the junior positions, and only the junior learns the true state. If the minis-
ter engages in communication, as the solid line in Figure 1, the junior ￿rst
5delivers message from the signal space S to the senior, and the senior in turn
chooses m from the message space M and send to the minister. The strategy
for the junior thus is ￿jb : ￿ ! ￿S, and for the senior is ￿m : S ! ￿M.
The minister forms a posterior about the true state conditional on the mes-
sage received from the senior, and chooses his ideal action y : M ! Y . The
optimal response thus is y = E [￿jM ]. To get rid of multiple equilibria prob-
lem common in cheap talk game4, we would focus on the most informative
equilibrium, i.e., the Pareto-dominance one.
Alternatively, if the minister chooses delegation, she gives the senior full
control over the interval Ysb ￿ Y , e.g., the amount of budget he can choose.
The senior can ask the junior to send message from the signal space S, and
implement his best response ysb = argmax
y2Ysb
￿(E [￿jS] ￿ y + bsb)
2. Otherwise,
the senior can subcontract, i.e., delegate decision right, with the junior by
granting him the list of actions Yjb ￿ Ysb, as the dashed line in Figure 1.
3.1 Benchmark: direct interaction
We start from the benchmark case that the sender can send messages to
the decision maker directly, who then updates belief about the true state
and makes decision. Thus we return to the classical CS model, as Lemma 1
summarizes
Lemma 1 (CS 1982) If the informed party could talk with the decision
maker directly, then informative communication occurs if jbjbj ￿ 1
4, and in
equilibrium the induced set of actions consists of ￿nite elements.
This pessimistic result obtains due to the decision maker￿ s inability to
commit, which means that the DM would update his belief and select ex post
best action upon receiving message. The DM gains by keep the control but
loses in motivating the sender to provide information. The information loss is
signi￿cant since only ￿nite actions would be undertaken. The communication
is informative if the minister would have ￿ner partition about the state after
hearing messages. It naturally leads to questioning whether and how the DM
could improve the e¢ ciency.
By delegating authority to the informed party, the DM (minister) allows
the agent to implement his preferred action from a prescribed set, thus this is
in e⁄ect equivalent to making commitment to a decision rule. The DM forges
4Babbling equilibrium (Uninformative communication equilibrium) always exists in
cheap talk game, in which the DM would always implement the ex ante optimal action
E [￿] = 1
2
6the ￿ exibility in decision-making to facilitate the use of information. In par-
ticular, there is full information transmission under complete delegation in
that the preferred action of informed party could be always selected. Golts-
man et al (2009, henceforth GHPS) establishes that the optimal delegation
scheme a la Holmstrom (1977), in which the informed party is given control
over a limited interval of Y , can attain the second-best optimal outcome
whenever the DM has commitment power.
Lemma 2 If the decision maker can delegate authority to the informed party,
then outcome would be better than optimal communication outcome if 0 ￿
bjb ￿ 1




￿ + bjb;if ￿ 2 [0;1 ￿ 2bjb]
1 ￿ bjb; otherwise
The optimal delegation set of action is an interval truncated on the top,
which is determined by the intensity of con￿ ict of interest between the min-
ister and the informed party. Optimal delegation seeks the balance between
the loss of control right and the gain of information. In low state the latter
e⁄ect outweighs, thus the informed party is allowed to act according to his
interest. The former e⁄ect dominates in high state and the decision maker
keeps de facto control by imposing a ceiling (1 ￿ bjb). Thus the information
is perfectly revealed in the lower interval, whose size is decreasing with re-
spect to the preference misalignment. This optimal delegation would serve
as the e¢ cient delegation set for our analysis on hierarchical delegation. The









[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ bjb)]






Various authors have provided characterization of optimal delegation mech-
anisms, including using arbitration to resolve dispute (Melumad and Shibano,
1991), optimal interval delegation (AM 2008), veto-power of the decision
maker (Mylovanov, 2008), and stochastic delegation (Kovac and Mylovanov,
2009). More precisely, AM establishes the conditions for the interval delega-
tion, which is restated in current environment as the following:
Lemma 3 The optimal delegation set from the minister to informed agent
is a connected set.
7This lemma states that the delegation set contains either no decision, one
decision5 or an interval of decisions. For negatively biased junior we have
that the optimal delegation set is truncated on the bottom.
Corollary 1 If ￿1
2 ￿ bjb < 0, then e¢ cient delegation set is Y ￿ = [￿bjb;1].
This corollary is a straightforward application of Lemma 2. Since now
the junior bureaucrat is downwardly biased, the consequence of con￿ ict of
interest is more intense in low state, thus the minister needs to restrict the
discretion of the junior there. Therefore, now the lower bound is present
instead of the cap.
4 Hierarchical Delegation
Under interval hierarchical delegation, the minister cannot directly contact
with the action-level junior bureaucrats6. Because it has already established
that meaningful delegation, which means that there are more than one action
in delegation set, requires that bjb ￿ 1
2. We would focus on the case that
jbsbj;jbjbj ￿ 1
2.
We would use ￿ ￿ bjb￿bsb to represent the divergence of con￿ ict between
the junior and the senior. As a useful benchmark, we ￿rst examine the
situation that the delegation is not allowed to transfer. In other words, the
senior is allowed to select action from a set of alternatives, but he is not
allowed, or lack the necessary commitment power, to further delegate this
authority to the junior (Dessein 2002, Ambrus et al, 2010). Therefore the
standard CS cheap talk applies between them, and the results are similar to
Lemma 1, though now ￿, rather than bi, determines the equilibrium outcome,
and the ￿nal decision undertaken may be restricted by the minister.
Then we check the performance when subcontract (further delegation to
the junior) is possible. We say an interval of actions Y 0 is implementable
if Y 0 ￿ Yjb ￿ Ysb, in other words, the actions realized should be in the
interest of the junior, the senior and the minister. The implemented set is
the ￿nal delegation interval of the junior in the sense that only the junior
has the relevant expertise to choose proper action. The senior acts as if a
5This would be the ex ante optimal response EDM[￿] = 1
2:
6The senior bureaucrats may actively prevent the direct link between his subordination
and supervision. The behavior of Sir Humphrey Appleby, the permanent undersecretary
in the ￿ctional Department of Administrative A⁄airs in the BBC series Yes, Minister,
vividly illuminates this point.
8mechanism designer whose set of available actions is restricted to an interval
Ysb, and makes delegation decision based on the relative di⁄erence of bias
￿, thus the only way of the minister to control delegation is to restrict Ysb.
The delegation rule available to the minister thus is subject to the incentive
compatibility of senior.
Lemma 3 immediately leads to that if Ysb is an interval or a point, so is
Yjb. The minister thus will just limit the menu of actions by imposing upper-
and lower-bound. Then we turn to characterize the implemented delegation
set of the junior.
Proposition 1 If ￿ > 0; the highest available alternative to the junior yjb =
minf1 ￿ ￿ + bsb;supfy jy 2 Ysbgg
This proposition demonstrates the impact of con￿ ict of interest between
the minister and the senior. If the senior is granted with large discretion
power, then he would act in his own interest, and the delegation set imple-
mented ([0;1 ￿ ￿ + bsb]) di⁄ers from the e¢ cient one ([0;1 ￿ bjb]), as shown
in Figure 2. However, it also suggests that the minister could control the loss
from this divergence of ideal actions by truncating the delegation set, i.e.,
imposing upper-bound 1 ￿ bjb on Ysb. The e¢ cient delegation set would be
implemented in hierarchical structure.
Figure 2. Property of optimal delegation set from DM and the mediator
standpoint, respectively. The bold line depicts the action chosen as function
of state ￿.
9Corollary 2 If the two bureaucrats are both positive biased and the senior
is less biased, i.e., bjb > bsb > 0, then the e¢ cient delegation set Y ￿ is
implemented by imposing supfy jy 2 Ysbg = 1 ￿ bjb
It￿ s routine to check that if these two agents are negatively biased and
bjb < bsb, then the e¢ cient delegation set is still implementable, though now
the device to get it is to truncate delegation set Ysb at the bottom.
Therefore, even though the senior is biased, the minister still can repli-
cate her optimal outcome under direct interaction by appointing a less biased
senior and truncating the delegation set. This intermediately biased senior
would like to widen the discretion of the junior, but this con￿ ict of interest
can be controlled by the minister by imposing a tight ceiling. The expected
utility of the minister thus would be the one in (2). Obviously, it signi￿cantly
increases the payo⁄ to the minister relative to the case that the authority is
not allowed to be transferred. The implication to promotion decision thus is
given the con￿ ict of interest among the bottom-level bureaucrats, the minis-
ter should ￿ll the undersecretary position with the person whose preference
is aligned, e.g. more "loyal" or "like-minded". The prediction that the min-
ister would like to assign the loyal agent to important position also receives
some empirical support from Iyer and Mani (2009), who ￿nd out that in
India the elected politician (Chief Minister) will award the loyal professional
bureaucrats with important positions.
However, this results crucially depends on that the senior is intermediately
biased. If the senior is more biased, or two agents are of opposite direction
of bias, then compared with the minister, the senior strictly prefers assigning
less discretion to the junior, and this implementation of e¢ cient outcome
fails.
Proposition 2 If the two bureaucrats are opposite biased or the senior is
more biased than the junior, then the e¢ cient delegation set would never be
implementable, i.e., Yjb 6= Y ￿:
We illustrate the failure of implementable e¢ cient delegation set in the
following ￿gures. In Figure 3(a), when two agents are of opposite direction
of bias, the elements of e¢ cient delegation set are everywhere higher than
those in Yjb, so Yjb ￿ Y ￿ if Y ￿ ￿ Ysb: Thus the minister has no way to force
the senior to authorize the junior to take any higher action than 1 ￿ ￿. In
particular, for meaningful delegation we need these two agents are not too
extremely biased when they have opposite interest, namely ￿ < 1
2. On the
other hand, as shown in Figure 3(b) when the senior is more biased, though
the minister prefers to truncate the junior￿ s behavior in high state, the senior
10is inclined to restrict the junior￿ s discretion in low state. Thus any action
lower than ￿￿ would not be authorized by the senior. Thus the minister
and the senior di⁄er in the direction in controlling the informed party.
Figure 3(a). The delegation set with opposite biased agents
Figure 3(b). The delegation set with extremely biased mediator
Finally, we fully characterize the optimal implemented delegation set un-
der di⁄erent bias of agents and the expected payo⁄ to the minister. We
should keep in mind that when either j￿j ￿ 1=2 or jbij ￿ 1=2 fail, the minis-
ter prefers to take ex ante optimal action 1
2 and there is no information gain
11from delegation, the expected payo⁄ thus would be ￿ 1
12. To focus on the
issue of interest and for the sake of simplicity, we assume that 1
2 ￿ bjb ￿ 0
(the case of bjb < 0 is perfectly symmetric), and there is no limitation on bsb.
Theorem 1 The optimal implemented delegation set prescribes the alterna-
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This theorem shows that the discrepancy of interest of the senior is irrel-
evant to the implementation of optimal delegation scheme as long as it lies
between the minister and the junior. Otherwise, the span of discretionary
authority of the junior, i.e., the implemented delegation set, would be in-




@bsb < 0 if bsb > bjb; and
@EUHD
DM
@bsb > 0 if bsb < 0.
Thus in general the more loyal the senior to the minister, the larger gain in
delegation.
125 Comparison with Hierarchical Communi-
cation
We have established the relationship between the performance of delegation
and the preference of bureaucrats, and shown that it￿ s ideal for the minister
to appoint a loyal senior. In reality, however, usually the selection of the o¢ -
cers is not made by the direct supervisor. For example, in the U.S. system of
separate powers, the executive (the President) appoints the administrative
agency managers, e.g., FDA, while the Congress dictates policy and oversees
its implementation. In terms of our model, the decision maker (Congress)
can choose neither the mediator (FDA) nor the informed sender (the phar-
maceutical company). Alternatively, she would respond by varying the level
of oversights (Warren, 2008).
In this section we ask the speci￿c question: if the minister cannot select
any bureaucrats, under what condition the delegation scheme will be chosen?
In particular, we compare hierarchical delegation with hierarchical commu-
nication given the preference of bureaucrats. This investigation involves the
allocation of authority in hierarchy: should the senior be given some decision
making right, or just act as an information gate-keeper? We ￿nd out that the
inability to access the informed party may reverse the conclusion in previous
study that the DM is better o⁄ by delegating.
Hierarchical communication shares with hierarchical delegation with the
same structure: vertical hierarchy, but di⁄ers in whether the minister rel-
egates some controls to the senior. Under hierarchical communication in
equilibrium the senior can only convince the minister on which partition the
state lies in, i.e., the minister takes decision as the optimal response to a
certain partition.
The uninformed mediator can improve information transmission upon di-
rect cheap talk by using mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e., mix or conceal some
messages (Mitusch and Strausz, 2005). If the senior prefers less expenditure
on a speci￿c program than the minister, while the junior wants more budget,
then upon hearing from the junior, it￿ s optimal for the senior to distort the
message downward randomly. Anticipating this random distortion, the ju-
nior￿ s incentive of exaggregation reduces. In particular, he realizes that the
￿nal outcome is not even monotonic with respect to his reports. Therefore he
would like to speak out more honestly7. The minister thus gains by relaxing
incentive compatibility constraint of the junior. Ivanov (2010) shows that
7The intuition is also explored by Blume et al (2007), in which noise in communication
invalids the monotonicity condition of action with respect to message.
13with a properly biased mediator, the DM could attain the optimal cheap
talk outcome a la GHPS (2009).
Lemma 4 (Ivanov 2009) For any bjb 2 [0; 1
2], there exists a mediator with
bias bsb 2 (￿2bjb;0] and an equilibrium in the game with this mediator that
provides EUHC
DM = ￿1
3bjb (1 ￿ bjb). However, if bsb 2 [0;bjb), the mediator
communication could not improve upon direct talk.
The intermediately biased senior (0 < bsb < bjb) could not improve e¢ -
ciency upon direct talk since mixing messages is not in his interest. We could
compare the maximum e¢ ciency in communication EUHC
DM with the outcome
of hierarchical delegation. Since
@EUHD
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3bjb (1 ￿ bjb), we could say that for any bsb > b0
sb,
hierarchical delegation strongly dominates mediator cheap talk in the sense
it can achieve higher payo⁄ than the maximal payo⁄ attainable in mediator
talk. The resulted b0
sb turns out to be a nonlinear function of bjb, which is
formally de￿ned by the following equation:
￿b
2














bjb (1 ￿ bjb) (6)
The higher dashed curve OB in Figure 4 describes this indi⁄erence line.
Unfortunately, there is non-monotonic relationship between the existence
k-action mixed equilibrium and the bias of senior. Ambrus et al (2009) show
that though two-action mixed equilibria requires that bsb is "su¢ ciently" far
below zero, 3-action mixed equilibria can exist when both bjb and bsb are close
to 0. This non-monotonicity in hierarchical communication limits complete
characterization about the relative e¢ ciency of two organization modes.
However, we still obtain the striking ￿nding that informative communi-
cation may dominates delegation. To illustrate this, we compare the range
of values of bsb for the existence of two-interval equilibrium in HC mode and
meaningful HD mode (the minister would ￿nd out optimal to delegate more
than one decision). We relegate in Appendix B the construction of two-action
mixed equilibria under HC, and note that any meaningful HD requires the
following inequality being satis￿ed:
￿b
2












14Namely for the minister delegating more than one decision is better than
taking ex ante optimal action 1
2.
Figure 4 demonstrates this comparison. OB and FB represents (6) and
(7), respectively. Thus the delegation is meaningful only if bsb lies above FB.
The trapezium ABCD speci￿es the range of values of bsb for which the two-
partition equilibrium exists8. For slightly biased senior (bsb higher than the
higher dashed curve OB), delegation strictly dominates mediator cheap talk
in the sense that it generates higher expected payo⁄than the best attainable
under communication. For large biased senior (bsb ￿ ￿1
4 but ￿ ￿ 1
2) and less
biased junior (the lower triangle DEF), again delegation dominates. How-
ever, when the junior becomes more biased and the senior is only modestly
biased, like those bsb lies in the shadow triangle BCE, communication would
be informative and dominates any delegation scheme.
Figure 4. The comparison of expected payo⁄ under HD and HC modes.
Therefore, if the two o¢ cers are of same direction of bias and given hi-
erarchy, i.e., both conservative, then the minister should delegate the senior
with limited discretion power. On the other hand, if the two bureaucrats are
of opposite interest, i.e., conservative senior vs. radical liberal junior, in par-
ticular if the senior is slightly conservative but the junior is very radical, it￿ s
possible that communication could induce informative talk but delegation is
trivial in that only one decision is relegated. The minister may keep control
rights and restrict the role of the undersecretary to information processing,
instead of delegate decision rights. The following numerical example exem-
pli￿es this claim:
8It￿ s de￿ned by 0 ￿ bsb ￿ ￿1
4 and bjb ￿ 1




15Example 1 Suppose bjb = 1
3, the upper-bound of communication e¢ ciency
is ￿ 2
27, which could be achieved by choosing bsb = ￿1
9. On the other hand,
by (6), if bsb ￿ ￿0:089, then delegation strongly dominates communication.
Hence, for some range of the senior￿ s bias, for instance, bsb = ￿1
9, commu-
nication generates higher expected payo⁄ than delegation.
Therefore we reverse the central conclusion in Dessein (2002) regarding
the e¢ ciency of delegation, in which whenever there is informative commu-
nication in cheap talk, delegation dominates communication. Moreover, as
GHPS have shown, under direct interaction the limited delegation scheme can
implement the second-best outcome where the DM has commitment power.
Thus by optimal delegation the minister could do no worse than cheap talk.
Hence the minister should always engage in delegation instead of communi-
cation. However, we show that this result would not hold when the minister
cannot access informed party. It￿ s possible that for some range of bias there
is gain in mediator talk but no meaningful delegation scheme.
Because the minister cannot access the junior, i.e., she cannot observe
message s, she has to take the incentive of senior into account when making
decision based on m. Moreover, any decision rule she commits to has to
be in the best interest of senior. In other words, due to the fact that the
senior controls information ￿ ow, there are only limited action rules available
to the minister under delegation. When the minister ￿nds out that under
any available decision rules the loss of control is too large she may forgo
delegation and engage in communication, in which the gain in keeping de-
cision right outweighs the loss in information transmission. The minister is
reluctant to delegate or rubberstamp not due to commitment cost or ex post
temptation to renege, as previous works suggest. Instead, it￿ s the inability
to interact with the informed party directly. As consequence, the possible
solution to this problem is not o⁄ering commitment device or reputation con-
cerns. Instead, organization design, in particular the layers in organization,
matters in solving commitment problem and providing proper incentives for
real informed agent.
This result also suggests that job design is related to hiring policy since the
loyalty of senior determines what the senior could do. The elected politician
would like to retain control over decision if she cannot replace the bureau-
crats. Thus even though the hierarchy as a structural feature of bureaucracy
is well de￿ned, the job content of each position depends on the authority of
the minister over personnel management.
166 Personnel Management in Hierarchy
In this section we would investigate the personnel management in bureau-
cratic organization, i.e., how to ￿ll the positions in hierarchy. This involving
question contains the choice of senior and junior, i.e., the hiring policy and
promotion decision.
The ￿rst question is given the con￿ ict of interest of two o¢ cers, if the min-
ister can reorganize the department, which one should be assigned to higher
position? It di⁄ers from promotion decision in that it involves complete re-
assignment of jobs, instead of promote someone while leave the junior level
unchanged. To deal with this question, we assume that both bureaucrats
are of positive bias, i.e., b2 > b1 > 0. The minister thus needs to tradeo⁄
between using the more biased junior 2, in which the information loss only
occurs on the top, and using the less biased junior 1, where the minister may
gain information in high state on the expense of loss in low state. We ￿nd
out that the more biased agent will be assigned to the junior position only if
his bias is su¢ ciently far from the other agent.






Therefore, a moderately biased senior can help controlling the more bi-
ased junior, but the minister can also ￿nd out that it may be bene￿cial
to assign this moderately biased agent to the action-level and promote the
more biased guy, in order to enlarge the range of implemented delegation set.
While a loyal senior provides the minister with better control of the informed
party indirectly, the loyalty in the action level reduces the loss of control di-
rectly. The indirect gain in control due to loyal senior cannot compensate
the direct loss if the other candidate is not very biased. Thus given the pool
of bureaucrats, it￿ s not necessarily that the senior is more loyal, even if the
minister has the full power to organize the hierarchy and assign the jobs.
6.1 Selecting the junior
We have studied the choice of the senior for the minister, given the bias of the
junior. It corresponds to the promotion policy in bureaucratic organization,
and we show that the more loyal bureaucrat should be placed into senior
position.
In reality, however, usually the minister cannot remove the senior o¢ -
cer. For example, in UK government the permanent undersecretary is the
non-political civil service head of a government department, they report and
17advise the Secretary of State, and are answerable to Parliament. However,
the minister may have some voices in screening the entry-level (junior) bu-
reaucrat. In this subsection we explore the selection of the junior given the
preference of the senior and the minister.




@bjb ￿ 0 for almost all cases9, which means that the
minister is harmed by the con￿ ict of interest between the minister and the
informed junior. Second, there exists complementarity between the bias of




To understand the implications of these comparative statics, we should
think about the hiring policy of bureaucratic organization. Given the pref-
erence of the senior o¢ cer and a pool of candidates for the junior position,
which one should be selected as the junior bureaucrat? Suppose the senior is
conservative (bsb > 0), then if the neutral minister chooses a more conserva-
tive junior (bjb > bsb), then the e¢ cient delegation set is implementable (the
￿rst part of (3)), and the expected payo⁄of the minister (the ￿rst part of (4))
is decreasing with respect to the con￿ ict of interest of the junior. Therefore,
the minister would like to appoint a bureaucrat no more conservative than
the senior. On the other hand, if the minister selects a liberal junior (bjb < 0),
then the senior wants to impose more restriction on the discretionary of the
junior than the minister, thus the minister again gains by appointing a less
liberal junior.
Hence to check the increasingly conservative senior bureaucrat, the min-
ister should either select the less radical one if all candidates are liberal, or
choose optimally conservative one10 if all just di⁄er in the degree of conser-
vatism. But in general, the minister would like to appoint a compromise
junior (bsb > bjb > 0). The general implication is the minister will check the
con￿ ict of interest of the senior by deliberating selecting the junior. Iyer and
Mani (2009) also examine the Chief Minister/District Politician/Bureaucrat
hierarchy in India, and ￿nd out that when the Chief Minister and the District
Politician are elected from the di⁄erent parties, then the Chief Minister is
more likely to change bureaucrat. In broad sense our implication is consistent
with their results.
More interesting results can be obtained if the minister (DM) and the
senior (mediator) have joint control over the selection of junior (sender). To





, i.e., the bureaucrats
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10As we derive in footnote 9, it should be bjb = 2b2
sb if bsb ￿ 1
2
18have the same direction of bias, like conservatism, but di⁄er in the extent.
Therefore, the selection of junior will depend on the total expected welfare
of the minister and the senior.
Suppose the expected payo⁄of the minister and the senior enter the total





jb + 2bjbbsb ￿ b2
sb ￿ 4b2




jb + 2bjbbsb ￿ b2
sb, if bsb > bjb
(8)
Take derivatives of W with respect to bjb, we have b￿
jb =
bsb
2 if bsb > bjb,
and b￿












W (bjb = bsb). Therefore, the neutral minister and the conservative senior
will jointly select less conservative candidate for junior position.
This is a compromise choice between the preferred choice of the minister
and that of the senior. To see this, note that if bsb > bjb, then
@EUHD
DM
@bjb = 0 if
bjb = 2b2
sb. Moreover, EUHD
DM (bjb = 2b2
sb) > EUHD
DM (bjb = bsb). Therefore the
minister prefers to choose the junior with the intensity of con￿ ict as 2b2
sb. On
the other hand, the senior￿ s preferred choice is the junior with bjb = bsb￿2b2
sb.
The analysis above is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The minister and the senior has di⁄erent ideal junior. The
junior that maximizes the joint welfare will be in exact middle position be-
tween the minister and the senior.
The minister has to tradeo⁄ the e¢ ciency loss from the limitation in low
state imposed by the senior, and the gain in more information in high state.
When the senior bureaucrat is modest conservative, i.e., bsb ￿ 1
4, then the
minister prefers to appoint a junior with the preference close to herself. She
knows that though he will impose more restriction on the low state, she
gains even more since the like-minded junior can improve e¢ ciency in high
state. When the senior bureaucrat is very conservative, i.e., bsb > 1
4, for the
minister the loss due to this extreme senior outweighs the gain in loyalty
from the junior, thus she wants to ￿ atter the senior by appointing a junior
closely related to him. This logic reverses for the senior. As the result of
compromise, these two parties will reach an exactly middle junior.
6.2 Uncertainty about the preference
In real world it￿ s usually that the top-level leader doesn￿ t know the true pref-
erence of the bottom-level workers due to the limited information processing
19ability or lack of direct access. On the other hand, the middle-level man-
ager may have more precise knowledge about the direct subordinates. This
bounded rationality argument provides a rationale for hierarchy (Radner
1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994). In our leading example, the minister
as an elected politician usually doesn￿ t know the interest of those bottom-
level junior bureaucrats, instead, the senior o¢ cer has better idea about the
intensity of the con￿ ict of interest of subordinates thanks to the relatively
stable organization within a department. In this subsection we explore the
delegation scheme in this situation where the knowledge about preference
cannot be conveyed to the supervisor. In other words, when the minister
designs the job, she just knows the con￿ ict of interest of the senior and the
fact that the senior knows the junior.
We assume that the minister only knows bsb and the distribution of bjb,






the minister only knows the junior is conservative or liberal, but has no idea
about the extent of bias. On the other hand, the senior knows bjb perfectly.
Because both agents are of the positive bias, the minister will only choose to
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jb (y ￿ 2bsb + bjb) ￿ (2bsb￿bjb)
3
3 ; if bsb > bjb > 0
(9)
Similarly as the intuition underlying Corollary 6 and Proposition 7, when
the junior is more biased than the senior, he prefers to give the junior more
freedom of action than the minister. Thus if his best ceiling is lower than y, in
other words, the junior￿ s bias is far away from the senior, he can completely
implement his preferred delegation set by choosing the upper bound 1+2bsb￿
bjb, as the ￿rst row in (9) shows. Otherwise, if his preferred ceiling is higher
than y, which means the junior is aligned to him, the restriction imposed by
the minister is binding and the implemented delegation set will also end up
in y, as the second row in (9) suggests. Moreover, if the junior is less biased
than him, then he always wants to impose the additional lower bound on the
span of control to the junior, as the third row suggests.
The minister gains from the ceiling if the junior is more biased than the
senior, since it restricts the senior￿ s tendency to relegate more freedom in
high state. However, the tight cap precludes possible bene￿cial adaptation
in high state when the junior is like-minded. The optimal delegation scheme
20balances loss of control and gain in knowledge, albeit now the information is
the knowledge about the intensity of preference misalignment. The precise
ceiling depends on which scenario above is more likely to occur. Furthermore,
the like-minded senior enables her to have better control of the informed
junior. In the limit case that bsb = 0, the senior is perfectly aligned to the
minister and she can relegate him full control of action. We calculate the
expected payo⁄to the minister under the uncertainty about the junior￿ s bias,
and found out that it￿ s optimal for her to grant complete delegation set when
the senior is not too biased11. Formally:







1. It￿ s optimal to her to set y such as
y =
￿





6 , if bsb > 1
4
2. If the ignorant minister can directly delegate to the junior, she will




3. For large span of the bias of the senior, it￿ s optimal for the minister
to delegate to the senior, instead of delegating to the junior even if she
has the opportunity.
The part 1) says that the upper bound of the delegation set varies with
respect to the bias of the senior, but not continuously. The part 2) says that
if the minister is uncertain about the preferences of the informed agent,
she will give him less discretion. This is consistent with the insights of
Armstrong (1995). The part 3) compares direct delegation with indirect
delegation thorough a strategic senior, and demonstrates that delegating to
a knowledgeable biased senior may bene￿t the minister more than direct
delegation.
This result provides a rationale for the exclusive concentration on full
delegation among researchers (Dessein 2002, Ambrus et al 2009): when the
minister is uncertain about the con￿ ict of interest of the informed party, and
the discrepancy of interest between the senior and her is not too large, it will
be bene￿cial to delegate all decision right to the senior who has the relevant
knowledge about the intensity of con￿ ict. The complete delegation scheme
thus arises as the optimization outcome of the minister.
11The quantitative result is obtained by the speci￿cation of the prior distribution. How-
ever, the qualitative results still remain.
21Moreover, this provides an additional rationale for the emergence of hi-
erarchy. We compare the expected payo⁄ to the minister if she can delegate
to the junior directly, though she still doesn￿ t know the exact bias of the
junior. It￿ s shown that if the con￿ ict of interest of the senior is not too
large (bsb < 1
5), then delegating to an informed senior will generate higher
expected payo⁄ to the minister than direct delegation. A slightly biased
knowledgeable senior provides the minister with the better control of the
informed party, thus the hierarchical structure itself exempli￿es the tradeo⁄
between the loss of control to the senior and gain in the knowledge of the
senior. The minister optimally forgoes the direct access to the unacquainted
informed party, and relies on the acquainted knowledgeable intermediary to
control the bottom executives instead. The asymmetric knowledge between
the senior and the minister thus leads not only to complete delegation, but
also the use of hierarchy to control informed agents.
It worth noting that the minister cannot gain by adding a pre-play com-
munication stage in which the agents can send a report about bjb.12 That￿ s
because the optimal delegation scheme prescribes that the minister only im-
poses a ceiling on Ysb, which is determined by bjb. Therefore, both the junior
and the senior have the common interest to convince the minister that there
is no con￿ ict of interest of the junior, i.e., bjb = 0. Thus both reports are
uninformative and the preplay communication leads babbling equilibrium.
If the minister announces that the junior can be promoted if the reported
bjb < bsb, this promise is not credible since by Corollary 11, it￿ s not always
in the interest of the minister to assign the more loyal agent to the senior
position.
7 Conclusion
The fact that within hierarchical organization, especially government, the
span of discretionary authority decreases top down motivates our research
on optimal interval delegation in hierarchy. This chapter contributes to liter-
ature by providing a complete characterization of the implemented interval
delegation set, and establishing conditions for attaining e¢ ciency in hier-
archy. Moreover, we also endogenize the hierarchy structure and complete
delegation as response to incomplete knowledge about the con￿ ict of interest.
The results that the optimal intermediary in delegation chain should be mod-
erately biased, and allowing transfer of authority bene￿ts decision maker are
intuitive. We also use this framework to show that the HRM practices within
12The author thanks David Martimort for raising this point.
22bureaucratic organization, i.e., job design, promotion, and hiring policy, are
interrelated.
It worthwhile to note that in most parts we study the three-tier hierarchy
and ignore the multiple subordinates tree structure, which is a more realistic
feature of hierarchy. However, as long as hierarchy is formed based on the
consideration beyond strategic information transmission, such as information
processing cost (Radner, 1993), heterogenous knowledge (Garicano, 2000) or
con￿ ict over hiring and promotion decisions (Friebel and Raith, 2004), our
results still hold in multiple subordination structure.
Mechanism design literature has demonstrated that the principal could
not be worse o⁄by commitment. However, this paper shows that given hier-
archical structure and divergence of interest, the set of decision rule available
to the minister is limited by the incentive of mediator, thus the minister
may ￿nd it￿ s no longer optimal to make a speci￿c commitment: delegation.
This result suggests that network structure matters in mechanism design
and implementation. Delegation is usually considered as an important form
of incomplete contract, which works as response to ex post renegotiation
or unveri￿able information. This chapter shows that speci￿c network struc-
ture can impose stringent restriction on the e¢ ciency of incomplete contract,
which is to a large extent still beyond the sights of theorists.
In this paper we stress interval delegation, which is in widespread use
and realistic in our budget approval example. However, for opposite biased
or more biased senior, interval delegation may not be the optimal delegation
scheme for the minister. Actually the optimal delegation may take the form
of an interval plus a discrete point. However, this optimal scheme though may
be of theoretical interest, is not realistic in bureaucratic situation, especially
in budget planning procedure in which free disposition may preclude any
possibility of discrete action13.
A Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1: See Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in CS.
Proof of Lemma 2: See Theorem 1 in GHPS (2009).
Proof of Lemma 3: Proposition 2.1 in AM (2008) establishes the condi-
tions for interval delegation. They de￿ne backward bias T (￿) (see (1) there).






strictly convex for all ￿. Thus the optimal delegation set is a connected set.
Proof of Corollary 1
13The author thanks Oliver Hart for suggesting this point.
23By Lemma 3 the delegation set is a connected set. Without loss of general-
ity, let this connected set be a closed interval of state
￿
minf￿ + bjb;0g;maxf￿ + bjb;1g
￿
2
Y where the informed party could select any action within this interval, i.e.,





any ￿ + bjb ￿ 1 to be optimal from the minister standpoint, we need that
she is indi⁄erent between her best response given that ￿ ￿ ￿ and delegated
action ￿ + bjb. This would lead to 1 ￿ 2bjb = ￿: Since bjb < 0, this would be
impossible, so ￿ = 1 has to be satis￿ed.
On the other hand, this the lower bound ￿ + bjb should also be the best
response of the minister when she knows that the true state locates within
[0;￿], thus this ￿ should be equal to ￿2bjb. Therefore we reach the desired
conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 1
Since Yjb ￿ Ysb, the highest action available to the junior yjb can not
exceed the highest action in Ysb. On the other hand, by Lemma 2 if the
senior could select whatever delegation set in his interest, then the size of
delegation set relies only on the relative di⁄erence of bias ￿, thus the upper-
bound would be 1 ￿ ￿.
Proof of Corollary 2
Lemma 3 implies that Yjb is connected set if Ysb is connected, thus the
the minister can focus only on the upper-bound. Since ￿ < bjb, 1 ￿ ￿ >
supfy jy 2 Ysbg = 1 ￿ bjb, thus by truncating delegation set to the senior
with the highest action of e¢ cient delegation set 1￿bjb, the junior would be
limited to take any action less than 1 ￿ bjb, which is exactly the contents of
e¢ cient delegation set.
Proof of Proposition 2
1. We ￿rst study the case of opposite biased agents and show that the
e¢ cient delegation set is not implementable. Without loss of generality,
assume that bjb > 0 > bsb, so ￿ > bjb > 0. Suppose in contrast, the
e¢ cient delegation set Y ￿ = [0;1￿bjb] is implementable, then we should
have Y ￿ ￿ Ysb, namely there is an interval larger than [0;1￿bjb] belongs
to the senior￿ s delegation set.
Because the relative di⁄erence of interest is ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ < 1 ￿ bjb =
supfy jy 2 Y ￿g, by Proposition 1 the senior would like to only delegate
[0;1 ￿ ￿] to the junior, given his delegation set Ysb. Hence we get the
contradiction needed.
2. Now we check the case of extremely biased senior. Still without loss of
generality, we assume that bsb > bjb > 0. Hence ￿ < 0, and according
to Corollary 1, the senior would impose lower bound ￿￿ on Yjb, while
24Y ￿ prescribes zero lower bound. Since the senior￿prefers to truncate at
the bottom, the minister could not implement the e¢ cient delegation
set, in which the junior has control in low state.
Proof of Lemma 4: See Ivanov (2009) Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
Proof of Corollary 3
If the o¢ cer 2 is assigned as the junior, then as (4) shows, the ex-






2, while if the o¢ cer 1 becomes





these two formula it shows that it￿ s bene￿cial to appoint o¢ cer 2 only
if 4b3
2 ￿ (1 + 4b1)b2
2 + b2






Proof of Proposition 3
By (9), we divide the discussion into two parts: the binding ceiling level
y or not.
1. First, we study the case that the upper bound is always binding, namely
y < 1 ￿ bjb + 2bsb whenever bsb < bjb < 1
2. This condition translates
into y < 1
2 +2bsb. Thus we would use only the second and third row of
(9)
































The ￿rst term is the expected payo⁄if the junior is less biased than the
senior, where the senior will set the lower bound on Yjb. The second
term represents the expected payo⁄ if the junior is more biased than
the senior, where the senior will further delegate the control rights to
the junior up till y, the cap of his own authority.
Take the derivative of the above (10) and equal it to zero, we have







. Using the fact that F is uniform distribu-














25Check it with the initial condition y < 1










2. Second, we study the case that the cap sometimes may not hold, in
other words, y > 1
2 +bsb, thus the senior may aslo imposes his preferred
ceiling. Now all the three rows in (9) will enter the expected payo⁄ to









































jb(1 + 2bsb ￿ 2bjb)
#
dF (bjb)
The ￿rst term is the same as that in (10). The second term establishes
that when the junior￿ s preference is not far from the senior, the cap y
binds Yjb since the senior always prefer to delegate more to the junior.
The third term shows that when the junior is farther from the senior,
the senior will impose the ceiling in his interest.
The ￿rst order condition suggests that y = 1+2bsb or 1+bsb, both are
impossible since the highest action in Y is 1. However, since the second
order condition is always negative, we know that the minister always
gains by setting a higher y. Hence the minister will choose the highest
possible ceiling in his action set Y , the optimal y = 1. In other words,
the minister will completely delegate to the senior. The expected pay-
o⁄ is






We return to check the initial condition and get bsb < 1
4.








, we compare the expected payo⁄ to the minister under
these two y and ￿nd out that y = 1 generates higher payo⁄.
Thus we ￿nish the ￿rst part of this proposition. Now we turn to the
second part. Now the minister can directly delegate to the junior, but she
still has no knowledge about the bias of the junior. First, we have that for a
given upper bound y, the expected payo⁄ to the minister is





y￿bjb (y ￿ ￿)






Then the minister will choose y to maximize
R 1
2
0 EUDM (y)dF (bjb), the











Thus we get the expected payo⁄ under the optimal direct delegation scheme
is








It￿ s easy to see that (12) is always smaller than (14), thus we concentrate










0:1999, (13) is larger than (14). In other words, delegating to an informed
senior dominates delegating to the junior directly.
B Appendix B
We follow Ambrus et al (2009) closely to construct the two-action mixed
strategy equilibrium in hierarchical communication. We focus on the outcome-
equivalent perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that the junior reports s1 at
any ￿ 2 [0;x] and s2 at any ￿ 2 (x;1], the negatively biased senior (bsb < 0)
recommends action m1 to the minister after receiving message s1, and mixes
between m1 (with probability p) and m2 after getting message s2. Finally
the minister acts according to the report sent by the senior, y1 = m1 and
y2 = m2.
Since the minister understands for sure that ￿ ￿ x when she hears m2, we
need m2 = 1+x
2 . Because the senior must be indi⁄erent between sending m1
and m2 when he receives s1, we have m1 = 1+x
2 +2bsb. Similarly, the junior has
to be indi⁄erent between both actions at ￿ = x, so we get x = 1￿2￿. Thus
we substitute it into m1 and m2, and solve m2 = 1￿￿ and m1 = 1￿￿+2bsb.
By Bayesian Law, the minister must update her posterior in such way that
E (￿jm1) = m1, so we have
x
2 Pr(￿ 2 [0;x]jm1) + 1+x
2 Pr(￿ 2 [x;1]jm2) = m1
where Pr(￿ 2 [0;x]jm1) = x
x+(1￿x)p




By the feasibility requirement that p 2 [0;1] we get 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
2;bsb ￿ ￿1
4,
and ￿ ￿ 1
2 (1 + 4bsb).
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